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In the Spring 2010 volume of BPEA, we provided an analysis of U.S. labor market developments in 
the most recent recession (Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2011). We documented that, from the 
perspective of a wide range of labor market outcomes, the 2007-2009 recession caused the deepest 
labor market downturn in the postwar era. In the present paper, we update that earlier work and also 
provide new analyses and results regarding the extent and persistence of long-term unemployment 
in the aftermath of the recession.  
Section 1 provides a summary update of our original work, focusing on indicators of labor 
market adjustment such as Okun’s Law and the Beveridge Curve. We also discuss recent research 
regarding the implications of these indicators for the extent of structural unemployment and 
conclude that it appears to be limited. Section 2 extends our earlier analyses by describing a set of 
new facts about unemployment inflows and outflows, which determine the evolution of the 
unemployment rate and its duration distribution. We document a sharp increase since the recession 
in the incidence of measured monthly inflows to unemployment at reported durations that 
substantially exceed one month, which appears to reflect a rising incidence of reporting error in 
regard to labor force status and the continuity of periods spent unemployed. Based on this more 
complete characterization of net flows, in Section 3 we update the simulation of unemployment 
dynamics presented in Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010). The results of this simulation indicate that 
long-term unemployment will largely dissipate if exit rates for the short-term unemployed recover, 
reinforcing  our conclusion that the current extent of structural unemployment is quite limited. 
1. Update on labor market adjustment 
The labor market downturn that accompanied the 2007-2009 recession was the most severe 
experienced in the postwar era, and the subsequent recovery has been tentative and uneven. The 
most adversely affected groups include men in general as well as younger, less educated workers 
and individuals from ethnic minorities. Starting in early 2010, labor market conditions have begun 
to recover slowly. The unemployment rate, which peaked at 10.1%, fell to 9.1%, still 4.6 percentage 
points above pre-recession levels. Of the groups that experienced larger increases in their 
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unemployment rates during the recession, most have subsequently seen relatively larger declines in 
their unemployment rates, i.e. men, younger workers, and Hispanic workers (Table 1).
1
   
In our earlier paper, we showed that the nature of labor market adjustment until mid-2009 had 
displayed a notable resemblance to that observed in past severe downturns. However, the evolution 
of indicators of real activity and the labor market began to diverge from past patterns starting in 
2009. We summarized this divergence in the context of Okun’s Law and the Beveridge Curve, and 
concluded that labor market conditions were weaker than implied by historical relationships 
between real activity and the labor market.  Since then, there have been downward revisions to both 
GDP and the job-openings rate. In addition, the recovery in GDP and job openings slowed 
considerably in the first half of 2011 while the unemployment rate fell by about a percentage point. 
These developments brought the Okun’s Law relationship in line with historical observations and 
narrowed the divergence in the Beveridge Curve relationship.
2
  
Even though measures of real activity and the labor market are now better aligned compared 
with late 2009, recent observations on unemployment and job vacancies imply a rightward shift in 
the Beveridge Curve of around 2.7 percentage points.
3
  Based on a search and matching model that 
incorporates incentives for vacancy creation, this rightward shift is consistent with an increase in the 
natural rate of unemployment of about 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points (see Barnichon, Elsby, Hobijn, 
and Şahin, 2011, and Daly, Hobijn, Şahin, and Valletta, 2011). This shift and the implied increase in 
the natural rate have been interpreted by us and others as evidence of the growing importance of 
structural factors in the persistently high unemployment rate (see for example Kocherlakota, 2010). 
In our earlier paper, we identified potential causes of this deviation and evaluated three factors: 1. 
skill mismatch; 2. geographic mismatch arising from house-lock; and 3. emergency unemployment 
compensation. 
There has been a substantial amount of research done to address the quantitative importance of 
these channels since early 2010. Our view, which is informed by reviewing the recent literature, as 
well as some of our own work, can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
1 Two important exceptions to this pattern were workers with less than high-school education and black workers. Workers with less 
than a high-school diploma saw only a 0.6 percentage point decline in their unemployment rate after a huge 8.3 percentage-point 
rise during the recession. And following its initial surge, the unemployment rate of black workers has increased further, by 0.3 
percentage points.  
2 See Figures A1 and A2 in the accompanying web appendix. 
3 See Figure A3 in the web appendix. 
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1. Skill mismatch likely has contributed about 1 percentage point to the increase in the 
unemployment rate, with the range of estimates varying from about 0.25 to 1.75 percentage 
points (Barnichon and Figura, 2011; Estevão and Tsounta, 2011; Daly, Hobijn, Şahin, and 
Valletta, 2011; Şahin, Song, Topa, and Violante, 2011). However, available evidence suggests 
that the increase in unemployment that can be attributed to skill mismatch is not structural. 
Şahin et al. study a range of measures of mismatch, reflected by the imbalance of vacancy and 
unemployment shares across sectors and occupations. While these measures began rising from 
2007 until the end of the recession in mid-2009, they have declined significantly since then, 
suggesting that the impact of mismatch will largely disappear as the recovery proceeds. This 
pattern is consistent with dispersion in the sensitivity of sectoral activity to aggregate demand 
fluctuations (e.g. Abraham and Katz, 1986), but further research is needed to study the deep 
causes of mismatch. 
2. The role of geographic mismatch and the house-lock mechanism has been quantitatively 
negligible (Daly, Hobijn, Şahin, Valletta, 2011; Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak, 2010; Şahin, 
Song, Topa, and Violante, 2011; Valletta 2010).  The observation that the interstate migration 
rate declined during the recession was cited by some as motivating evidence for the importance 
of geographic mismatch. However, Kaplan and Schulhofer‐Wohl (2010) have shown that the 
significant drop reported in the annual interstate migration rate between 2005 and 2006 in the 
Current Population Survey was a statistical artifact arising from the procedure the Census 
Bureau used to handle missing data. The corrected data show that interstate migration has been 
trending downward for many years. Relative to that trend, there was no additional decrease in 
interstate migration during the December 2007 to June 2009 period.  
3. Recent research on the effect of Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) has shown 
that EUC has likely had an impact on the evolution of the natural rate of unemployment.  While 
estimates range from 0.3-3 percentage points, most studies find an effect of around 1 percentage 
point or less. (See Aaronson, Mazumder, and Schecter, 2010; Farber and Valletta, 2011; Fujita, 
2010; Nakajima, 2010; Rothstein, 2011; Valletta and Kuang, 2010; and Valletta, 2010).  
To summarize, recent research indicates that skill mismatch and EUC have contributed to the 
deviation in the Beveridge Curve. However, because this deviation of the Beveridge Curve has 
occurred at very low levels of vacancies, it is difficult to separate shifts in the curve that reflect an 
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increase in matching frictions from short-term cyclical adjustments back toward the curve’s initial 
position; at low vacancies, along the flat portion of the curve, small increases in vacancies imply a 
large deviation from the prior position of the curve.  The existing evidence that we cite above 
suggests that the cyclical component has been much more important than the increase in frictions, 
and that the latter will dissipate as the labor market recovery progresses and the EUC extensions are 
eliminated.  
The continued weakness of the labor market thus appears mainly to be due to the continued 
shortfall in aggregate demand. The modest recovery in labor demand has been too weak to generate 
a substantial decline in the unemployment rate.  
An ongoing development that appears at odds with our claim of limited matching frictions is the 
observation that the U.S. is experiencing a record level of long-term unemployment, which has 
intensified rather than improved during the two years since the recession ended. This can be seen 
from Figure 1, which plots the unemployment rate decomposed into six duration groups. As of July 
2011, 4 percent of the labor force reported that they had been unemployed for more than six 
months, with three quarters of those unemployed for more than a year. The extent and persistence of 
long-term unemployment raises the concern that the U.S. might develop a long-term unemployment 
problem of the type that many European countries experienced after the severe recessions of the 
1970s and 1980s (referred to as “Eurosclerosis”). However, in the next two sections we provide new 
evidence indicating that the risk of the U.S. developing its own version of Euroslerosis—which we 
term “Amerisclerosis”—is not likely, based on our updated and extended analysis of net 
unemployment flows and simulations of the resulting unemployment dynamics.  
2. Unemployment inflows and outflows reconsidered 
In Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010) we used a labor market flows framework to discuss the 
evolution of the U.S. labor market during the Great Recession. A first clue to the potential sources 
of recent developments in the unemployment rate can be gleaned from an anomaly that has emerged 
in the behavior of two leading measures of these unemployment flows.  
The first measure constructs flow transition probabilities from the longitudinally-matched 
individual-level data in the Current Population Survey (CPS). For example, the unemployment-to-
employment transition probability can be estimated using these data by computing the fraction of 
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the unemployed in a month who subsequently report they are employed in the following month’s 
survey. Estimates of these aggregate transition probabilities for 1990 onwards are available from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2008), while pre-1990 estimates have been made available by 
Shimer (2007). A drawback of these estimated flows is that they appear to contain a large number 
of spurious transitions, especially between unemployment and non-participation.
4
  
A second measure of labor market flows can be inferred from the reported duration structure of 
unemployment (Perry, 1972; Shimer, 2007). This measure estimates the outflow rate from 
unemployment using cross-sectional data on the stock of unemployed workers,   , and the number 
unemployed for less than 5 weeks,   
   , rather than longitudinal microdata data on the flows. 
Using these data, Shimer (2007) computes the unemployment outflow hazard according to 
                  
            . (1) 
Shimer’s outflow hazard can be interpreted as follows. First, one calculates the fraction of those 
unemployed this month who are still unemployed next month. If all inflows into unemployment 
consist of persons who report a duration of unemployment shorter than 5 weeks, then this fraction 
equals the number of persons unemployed next month,     , minus those unemployed next month 
with a duration of unemployment shorter than 5 weeks,     
   , expressed as a fraction of the number 
of currently unemployed,   . Second, one transforms this one-month unemployment “survival” rate 
into a continuous-time outflow hazard. This is the unemployment outflow measure that we used for 
the majority of the analysis in Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010).  
Figure 2 displays Shimer’s estimate of the outflow hazard together with the unemployment-to-
employment transition rate, where each is plotted as a logarithmic deviation from its respective 
historical mean. As we noted in our original paper, historically these two measures have moved 
very closely together over the business cycle. Towards the end of the recession in mid-2009, 
however, a discrepancy emerged between the two series: Shimer’s measure exhibited a much larger 
cyclical downturn than the unemployment-to-employment transition rate. 
What might account for this anomaly? A natural candidate is suggested by the observation that 
the outflow rate    not only captures flows from unemployment to employment due to people 
                                                 
4 See Poterba and Summers (1995) and references therein for a discussion of these spurious flows. 
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finding jobs, but also flows from unemployment into non-participation. Thus, one might think that 
the recent deviation in Figure 2 reflects a decline in the number of unemployed dropping out of the 
labor force relative to those finding jobs. In fact, the opposite turns out to be the case. Figure 3 
reveals that the flow transition rate from unemployment to non-participation has actually increased 
since the end of the recession, while that to employment has basically been flat. Far from raising the 
observed cyclical downturn in the estimated outflow hazard, this would tend to attenuate its cyclical 
amplitude relative to the unemployment-to-employment transition rate. 
What turns out to be driving the discrepancy is that the outflow hazard is calculated under the 
natural assumption that everyone who flows into unemployment in a month reports a duration of 
unemployment of 5 weeks or less. This assumption is not borne out by the data.  
To see this, consider Figure 4. It shows inflows into unemployment by reported duration as a 
share of the labor force. Historically, there have always been some inflows into unemployment at 
durations of 5 weeks or higher. Since the start of 2010, however, these inflows have increased in 
size and now comprise about half of the flows into unemployment. A quarter of the total inflows 
now reports durations of at least 6 months. Although in principle these flows should not exist, the 
reason they appear in the CPS can be traced to the way the survey records unemployment duration. 
In particular, nothing in the survey ensures that those who report that they are unemployed, but who 
were not classified as unemployed in the previous month’s survey, report a duration of 
unemployment of less than 5 weeks. As a result of these high-duration inflows, total inflows into 
unemployment exceed     
    in the longitudinally-matched data, particularly since 2010. 
Consequently, Shimer’s estimate of the outflow hazard has shown more of a cyclical decline than 
the outflow probabilities calculated based on the BLS (2008).
5
 
There are a number of potential interpretations of this phenomenon. A natural candidate is that it 
reflects random measurement errors, either in labor force status, unemployment duration, or both 
(Poterba and Summers, 1995). Applying this interpretation, however, requires ignoring the clear 
cyclical pattern reflected in the recent sharp increase in these flows. The cyclical pattern suggests 
that these inflows may reflect something economically more meaningful about the labor market 
                                                 
5 By the same token, the measure of the inflow rate into unemployment proposed by Shimer (2007), and used by us in our original 
paper, also misses these high duration inflows into unemployment, since it also is based on the number unemployed for less than 5 
weeks. Consistent with this, Figure A4 in the accompanying web appendix shows that this measure of the inflow rate has reverted 
completely to its pre-recession level. 
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decisions of CPS respondents than just measurement error. Though a detailed analysis of who 
makes up these inflows at high durations is beyond the scope of this update, a couple of points are 
worth noting. 
First, although approximately 60 percent of the inflows into unemployment at reported durations 
higher than one month originate from non-participation, only 25 percent of the inflows with 
duration less than one month originate from non-participation. These figures suggest that the 
majority of the high-duration inflows into unemployment are driven by individuals who stopped 
looking for work for some months and then started looking again in the survey month.
6
 When asked 
how long they have been looking for a job, it is quite plausible that they would report how long it is 
since they initially started looking, rather than when they resumed their search. Likewise, 
employment-to-unemployment flows at high durations are possible for individuals who took on a 
temporary or part-time job and continued looking for a better job while working.  
Thus, one interpretation of these high-duration inflows is that they signal individuals who would 
like to work more but are not able to find jobs to their liking. Under this interpretation, for those 
flowing in from employment the lack of jobs has led them to commit to a temporary solution while 
continuing to seek better opportunities, while for those flowing in from non-participation the lack of 
jobs has reduced their search effort. The latter group could be reasonably considered as behaving as 
marginally attached to the labor force.  
This brings us to the second aspect of these high duration inflows that is worth noting. The vast 
majority of those flowing in from non-participation and reporting durations in excess of one month 
were not classified as marginally attached when they were out of the labor force. As noted above, 
the increased incidence of these high-duration inflows since the recession ended suggests that this 
pattern does not solely reflect random measurement, but instead reflects periodic re-entry by 
individuals who are loosely attached to the labor market. If this interpretation is correct, it suggests 
that alternate measures of unemployment that include the marginally attached, like U5 and U6, have 
been understating the actual amount of labor underutilization since the recession ended. 
The pattern of inflows into unemployment at reported durations exceeding one month that we 
uncovered is important not only for understanding anomalies that have recently emerged in 
                                                 
6 This is also consistent with the observation that non-participants have continued to flow into unemployment at an increasing rate 
since the end of the recession. See Figure A5 in the accompanying web appendix. 
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estimates of unemployment flows, it is essential for understanding the dynamics of the duration 
distribution of unemployment and thus the dynamics of the long-term unemployment rate. We turn 
to this issue in the next section. 
3. Long-Term Unemployment: Amerisclerosis? 
In Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010) we presented a simulation of the future evolution of the 
aggregate outflow rate that accounted for outflow rates out of unemployment that vary substantially 
by duration. That simulation did not account for the inflows at high durations that have become 
increasingly prominent since we wrote our original paper.
7
 Because these inflows raise measured 
unemployment durations, ignoring them makes it very difficult to match the right tail of the 
unemployment duration distribution. Although the emphasis in the simulation in Elsby, Hobijn, and 
Şahin (2010) was not on the duration distribution, it substantially underpredicts the number 
unemployed at durations of 6 months or longer in the data. 
In order to simulate accurately the dynamics of the measured duration structure of 
unemployment, then, one needs to take into account both inflows and outflows into unemployment 
at all durations. Figure 4 has already summarized the duration structure of inflows into 
unemployment. Figure 5 plots analogous estimates of outflow rates from unemployment by duration 
and destination based on CPS microdata for the recent 12-month period of July 2010 through June 
2011. 
Despite the recent severity of long-term unemployment, job-finding rates among the long-term 
unemployed (defined as durations exceeding six months) remain sufficiently high that most will 
find work within a medium-term timeframe. The figure shows that each month an average of nearly 
11 percent of the long-term unemployed find a job. While this job-finding rate is at a historical low 
in the U.S., it is nonetheless slightly higher than the outflow rate of the French unemployed, 
averaged across the complete duration distribution as well as expansions and recessions (Hobijn and 
Şahin, 2009). At this rate, about half of the long-term unemployed in the U.S. will find a job within 
six months, and three-fourths will find a job within one year. 
                                                 
7 Other recent analyses that examine the duration distribution of unemployment and duration dependence in exit rates also do not 
account for the duration structure for inflows (e.g., Hornstein, 2011, and Rothstein, 2011),. 
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Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that it is very difficult for the long-term unemployed to find 
a job.
8
 However, Figure 5 reveals that though job-finding rates for the long-term unemployed are 
much lower than for the short-term unemployed, they change little as duration lengthens beyond six 
months. The job-finding rate for the very long-term unemployed, with durations of 18 months and 
higher, is not much lower than for those with durations of 6 to 18 months. 
The dynamics of the unemployment duration distribution are determined by the net outflow 
rates from unemployment at different duration bins (outflows, Figure 5, minus inflows, Figure 4). 
For example, the net outflow rate at durations of 1-3 months during a quarter is given by the share 
of those unemployed for 1 to 3 months who have not exited unemployment by the next quarter.
9
  
   
            
       
      . (2) 
The calculation of these net outflows is quite simple since it only involves counting unemployed 
individuals by duration bins and thus does not require the use of longitudinally-matched CPS data.  
This approach assumes that the reported durations are correct, which is appropriate for an exercise 
aimed at reproducing the duration distribution.
10
 
To consider how persistent the long-term unemployment problem in the U.S. might be, in Table 
2 we use these flow rates to construct three simulated paths of the unemployment rate. All three 
paths start with the average duration structure of unemployment and unemployment rate observed in 
the most recent data for 2011Q2. The first path, “2010-2011,” is simulated under the assumption 
that the net outflow rates will remain at the levels that prevailed in the most recent four quarters of 
data. The second path, “Expansion,” is simulated under the assumption that net outflow rates return 
immediately to the levels that prevailed during the preceding expansion, covering 2004Q1-2007Q1. 
Our main focus of interest is in the final path in Table 2, labeled “Counterfactual.” This 
performs a counterfactual experiment that provides some perspective on the possible effects of a 
recovery in labor demand for the short-term unemployed only. Specifically, it assumes that inflows 
                                                 
8 Rampell (2011), for example, discusses the phenomenon of job ads that explicitly require candidates to be “currently employed” or 
“recently unemployed.” This anecdotal evidence provides support for theories of unemployment dynamics in which applicants are 
ranked based on unemployment durations (e.g., Blanchard and Diamond 1994). 
9 For the rest of our analysis we use quarterly data because some of the monthly data turn out to be very noisy. The duration bins we 
consider are 1-3, 4-6, …, and 18+. 
10 All net outflow rates, except that for durations of 16 to 18 months, are lower in the recent four quarters than before the recession. 
For some duration bins, net outflow rates are negative, indicating that inflows exceed outflows. 
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into unemployment, as well as the net outflow rates of the short-term unemployed (with duration 
less than 6 months) return to their expansion-period average. The demand for long-term 
unemployed is assumed not to recover—their net outflow rates remain at their “2010-2011” levels. 
This counterfactual simulation corresponds to a scenario in which the long-term unemployed are 
essentially stuck at their existing, depressed rates of exit from unemployment, consistent with the 
notion that their current status reflects structural unemployment that will not dissipate as aggregate 
labor demand recovers. 
Table 2 reports the three paths for the unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate 
obtained from these simulations. The “long-run” values correspond to the implied flow-steady-state 
outcomes; the unemployment rates listed for prior years converge quickly to the steady-state values. 
As can be seen from the table, the net outflow rates observed over the past four quarters imply a 
steady-state unemployment rate of 9.5 percent, slightly above that in 2011Q2. Since the “2010-
2011” scenario suggests the labor market is approximately in its flow steady state, it implies that the 
long-term unemployment rate will barely budge going forward. 
If instead the inflow and net outflow rates instantaneously return to their expansionary levels, 
then the unemployment rate will drop rapidly to below 6 percent in mid-2012, 5.1 percent at the end 
of 2015, and converge to 5.0 percent. Interestingly, the latter corresponds to a leading current 
estimate of the pre-recession natural rate (CBO, 2011). Under this scenario, the long-term 
unemployment rate will drop rapidly, and will approximately return to its pre-recession level of 1.2 
percent as well. 
It is the counterfactual exercise, however, that is most informative regarding the factors that are 
likely to shape the recovery of the labor market. Under this scenario, in which net outflow rates 
remain unchanged for the long-term unemployed, the unemployment rate falls steeply to 6.0 percent 
by the end of 2015, and ultimately converges to 5.9 percent. The latter coincides with the latest 
estimate of the natural rate reported in Daly, Hobijn, Şahin, and Valletta (2011). The relatively 
modest increase in the steady-state unemployment rate relative to its expansionary values 
emphasizes the critical role of improvement in outflow rates for the short-term unemployed for 
lowering the overall unemployment rate. Strikingly, even though the counterfactual scenario 
assumed no improvement in the demand for the long-term unemployed, their unemployment rate 
falls to 1.9 percent, less than half of its value implied by current unemployment flows. 
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This exercise highlights two important lessons for the recovery of the U.S. labor market. First, a 
very effective way to prevent a long-term unemployment problem is to improve the likelihood that 
individuals find a job before they become long-term unemployed. Second, even in the context of the 
very depressed labor market conditions of recent years, the long-term unemployed are nonetheless 
finding jobs at a sufficient rate that a stimulus to the prospects of the short-term unemployed will 
fuel a rapid and near-complete recovery in the labor market as a whole.
11
  
4. Conclusion 
Since our original paper, Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2010), many other studies have confirmed that 
there is little evidence that increases in labor market frictions due to mismatch or the effects of the 
temporary extensions of unemployment compensation can account for a large part of the continued 
elevated level of unemployment. Instead, downward data revisions on economic activity released 
since our original analysis suggest that the labor market weakness is more in line with overall 
economic slack than we initially thought. 
Because of this continued weakness a record number of people now report to have been looking 
for a job for 6 months or longer. Recently measured unemployment durations have been propped up 
to an unusual degree by inflows to unemployment at reported durations exceeding one month. 
These inflows are typically ignored in the existing literature on unemployment duration dynamics 
but are essential to understanding the current environment.  In addition, we found that during the 
last year, over 10 percent of the long-term unemployed have found jobs each month, but this pace 
has not been rapid enough to reduce reported durations in the presence of the high-duration inflows. 
We used this information on the inflow and outflow rates at different durations to simulate the 
path of the unemployment rate under alternative scenarios for net outflow rates.  We found that 
even if exit rates for the long-term unemployed do not rise above their recent depressed values, an 
increase in exit rates for the short-term unemployed to their pre-recession levels will substantially 
reduce the long-term unemployment rate. Hence, we interpret the current flow dynamics of the U.S. 
labor market as indicating a low risk that the U.S. labor market will suffer from a bout of 
                                                 
11 This insight regarding the overwhelming importance of exit rates for the short-term unemployed is not new. For example, Nickell 
(1997) emphasizes this point when he discusses the importance of active labor market policies to aid the unemployed in European 
countries that did not suffer much from Eurosclerosis. Of course, active labor market policies are only one particular policy option 
to improve labor market outcomes of the short-term unemployed. Other types of stimulus might have a similar effect. 
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persistently elevated long-term unemployment (“Amerisclerosis”), even after the most severe 
recession in postwar U.S. history. 
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Figure 1. Unemployment rate by duration 
 
Figure 2. Cyclical movements in Shimer’s outflow hazard and unemployment-employment transition probability. 
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Figure 3. Transition probabilities out of unemployment by destination. 
 
Figure 4. Duration structure of inflows into unemployment 
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Figure 5. Transition probabilities out of unemployment by duration and destination 
 
 
Table 1. Change in unemployment rates by group 
  Recession Recovery 
Total 5.5 -0.9 
Gender     
Male  6.5 -1.6 
Female 4.3 -0.2 
Age     
16-24 8.8 -1.6 
25-54 5.4 -0.9 
55+ 4.0 -0.3 
Education     
Less than High Scool 8.3 -0.6 
High School 6.5 -1.0 
Some College 5.3 -0.9 
College or Higher 2.9 -0.4 
Race     
White 5.2 -1.1 
Black 7.5 0.3 
Hispanic 7.2 -1.1 
Note: Changes reported in percentage points. “Recession” refers to 2007Q2 through 2009Q4.  
“Recovery” sample is 2009Q4 through 2011Q2. 
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Table 2. Unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate under three scenarios 
 
2010-2011 Expansion Counterfactual 
 
Unemployment rate 
2013Q4 9.4 5.3 6.3 
2014Q4 9.5 5.2 6.1 
2015Q4 9.5 5.1 6.0 
Long-run 9.5 5.0 5.9 
 
Long-term unemployment rate (6+ months) 
2013Q4 4.4 1.4 2.4 
2014Q4 4.4 1.2 2.2 
2015Q4 4.4 1.2 2.1 
Long-run 4.4 1.1 1.9 
 
